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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STEVEN J. VANLEEUWEN,
No. 940586 CA
Claimant/Petitioner,
Priority No. 7
vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
CUSTOM LANDSCAPE SERVICES, and
CNA INSURANCE COMPANY,
Defendants/Respondents.

Statement of Jurisdiction
Jurisdiction of the Utah Court of Appeals is had pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. S 78-2a-3(2) (a) (1992), Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-86
(1994), and Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16 (1993).

Statement of Issue for Review
1.

Whether Worker's Compensation coverage should be expanded

to cover an employee driving to and from work in an employer
provided vehicle when the employer receives no benefit from the
travel.

Standard of Appellate Review
1.

Utah Code Ann. $ 63-46b-16(4) (1993) provides in parti

The Appellate Court shall grant relief only if, on the
basis of the agency's record, it determines that a person
seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced
by any of the following:

(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the
law;

When a grant of discretion is not involved the court must apply a
correction of error standard.

Walls v. Industrial Comm'n., 857

P.2d 964, 966 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).

Determinative Status
Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-45 (1988) (1994 supp.) is determinative
of this appeal.

That statute reads:

Each employee mentioned in Section 35-1-43 who is
injured and the dependents of each such employee who is
killed, by accident arising out of and in the course of
his employment, wherever such injury occurred, if the
accident was not purposely self-inflicted, shall be paid
compensation for loss sustained on account of the injury
or death, and such amount for medical, nurse, and
hospital services and medicines, and, in case of death,
such amount of funeral expenses, as provided in this
chapter. The responsibility for compensation and payment
of medical, nursing, and hospital services and medicines,
and funeral expenses provided under this chapter shall be
on the employer and its insurance carrier and not on the
employee.
Statement of the Case
Nature of the Case
The Petitioners in this case are seeking review of the
Industrial Commission's Order denying review of the decision by the
Administrative Law Judge.
Procedural History
A formal Adjudicative Hearing was held before the Honorable
Donald George. Judge George denied worker's compensation benefits
to the Petitioner.

Petitioner's Motion for Review was denied by

the Industrial Commission.

Petitioner is now seeking relief from

this denial.
2

Agency Disposition of the Case
Judge George denied

the Petitioner's

claim

for worker's

compensation benefits because this was not an accident arising out
of

and

in the

course

of

the

Petitioner's

employment.

The

Industrial Commission declined to review that decision.
Statement of Facts
This dispute arises out of a May 6, 1993 automobile accident
involving the Petitioner, Steven J. Vanleeuwen.

Transcipt of

recorded proceedings at p. 9, Vanleeuwen v. Custom Landscape
Services, (Industrial Comm'n. 1994)(n. 93-622) [hereinafter "R."].
At approximately 5:50 a.m., Vanleeuwen was traveling northbound on
7th East, whereupon he was struck by another vehicle traveling
eastound as he crossed the 39th South intersection.
11.

The driver of the other vehicle was killed.

R. at p. 10R. at p. 21.

Vanleeuwen was issued a citation for failing to stop at a red
traffic signal.

R. at p. 10.

Custom Landscape is located at the Triad Center. R. at p. 12.
Prior to allowing Mr. Vanleeuwen to drive the truck to and from
work, it was parked at the Triad Center parking lot.

Id.

The

Triad Center provides twenty-four hour security for its parking
facilities. R. at p. 33. Other than an occasional transient found
sleeping in the bed of the truck, there were no incidents of
vandalism or other problems concerning the security of the vehicle.
R. at p. 33.

3

At

the

time

of

the

accident

Vanleeuwen as a "Project Supervisor".

Custom

Landscape

employed

His duties involved, among

other things, mowing lawns and removing snow.

R. at pp. 10, 24.

Vanleeuwen worked approximately 40 hours each week and was paid by
the hour.

R. at p. 30.

Despite the fact that Custom Landscape

viewed Vanleeuwen as an excellent employee, it could not afford to
reward him.

Jd.

Custom Landscape then decided in lieu of an

increase in wages, they would allow Vanleeuwen to drive the company
truck to and from work.

R. at p. 30.

In this manner, Vanleeuwen

was rewarded for his service by being able to save wear and tear on
his own car and was guaranteed transportation to and from work. R.
at p. 30-31.

Though Vanleeuwen was allowed to charge fuel to a

company credit card, he was never paid for the time he spent
traveling to and from work, and he did not pick up other employees.
All vehicle maintenance was performed at the employer's premises.
R. at pp. 23, 32.
All of Custom's employees, including Vanleeuwen, were required
to gather at the employers premises at a specified time each
morning.

R. at pp. 22-23.

At that time a trailer containing

necessary equipment was hooked to the truck and driven to the
different job sites. R. at p. 24.

At the end of the work day the

trailer would be returned to the Triad Center, id.

Custom had no

control over the route Vanleeuwen traveled to or from work.
p. 31.

R. at

In fact, the only instruction Vanleeuwen had was that the

vehicle was not for personal use.

R. at p. 16 and p. 31.

Even

this instruction provided limited control as Vanleeuwen testified
4

that he would stop for dinner on his way home.

R , at p. 15. while

Vanleeuwen was on call during the winter months to perform snow
removal duties
May,

he w.is not on call when this accident occurred in

R. at p. 24.

Summary of Argument
The Utah Worker's Compensation Act provides coverage to
employees injured in accidents arising out of and in the course of
employment.

In determinirig whether an accident arises out of and

in the course of employment Utah courts look to the \ Jtdlitf
circumstances.

if the

Using what is commonly known as the "coming and

going" rule, courts have traditionally defined travel to or from
work as being outside the course and scope of employment.
Occasionally

fact

situations

arise

where

an

injury

is

considered to arise out of and in the course of employment despite
the fact that the employee is traveling to or from work.

The

Petitioner asserts that two such situations are analogous to the
present case.

First;, Petitioner asserts that, where an employer

furnishes transportation to the employee for the benefit
employer coverage has been granted.

u: the

In the present case this is

not true because the employer has retained no control and received
no benefit.
injured

while

Second, Petitioner argues that, if an employee is
being

transported

coverage has been qt anted.

in an employer's

conveyance

In the present case Vanleeuwen was not

being picked up and transported to work, as a result mor^ war: IM
control and no employer's conveyance.
5

This accident occurred while the employee was en route to
work. The sole benefit received by Custom was Vanleeuwen's arrival
at work, this has long been held insufficient to escape the "coming
and going" rule. Because Custom Landscape received no benefit from
and had no control over Vanleeuwen's use of the truck, the Court of
Appeals should uphold the decision of the Administrative Law Judge
and deny worker's compensation benefits.

Argument
I.

Petitioner Has Failed to Marshall the Evidence
This appeal presents a mixed question of law and fact. When

reviewing an agency's application of a statutory term, absent a
grant of discretion a "correction of error" standard applies.
Walls v. Industrial Comm'n. . 857 P.2d 964, 966 (Utah Ct. App.
1993).

When challenging findings of fact the court of appeals has

written:
To successfully appeal a trial court's findings of fact,
appellate counsel must play the devil's advocate.
"[Attorneys] must extricate [themselves] from the clients
shoes and fully assume the adversary's position. In
order to properly discharge the [marshalling] duty . . .,
the challenger must present, in comprehensive and
fastidious order, every scrap of competent evidence
introduced at trial which supports the very findings that
appellant resists." Once appellants have established
every pillar supporting their adversary's position, they
then "must ferret out a fatal flaw in the evidence" and
show why those pillars fail to support the trial court's
findings. They must show that the trial court's findings
are "so lacking in support as to be vagainst the clear
weight of the evidence,' thus making them vclearly
erroneous.'"
Onieda/SLIC v. Onieda Cold Storage and Warehouse, 872 P.2d 1051,
1052-53 (Utah Ct. App. 1994).
6

Respondents contend that Vanleeuwen has failed to discharge
his marshalling duty. Petitioner is directly contending tlle ALJ's
factual determination that the employer did not benefit from
Vanleeuwen's use of the truck and did not have control over the
vehicle at the time of the accident.

Order of Administrative Law

Judge, Vanleeuwen v. Custom Landscape Services, (Industrial Comm'n.
1994)(n. 93-622)[hereinafter

Order].

However, Petitioner has

failed to set forth all of the evidence demonstrating that a
benefit was received and that Custom had no control. No mention is
made of the fact that vandalism had not been a problem, that other
employees

were

not

Vanle* v*

picked

up en route

to the

office, that

paxu iox nio travel time, and that he would

occasionally stop for personal errands un I lie way I >me

R. at pp.

15, 23, 33.
Rather

thai i marshall the evidence, the Petitioner is now

attempting to re-try the case.

Vanleeuwen, "has merely presented

carefully selected facts and excerpts of trial testimony in support
of its position.

selective citation to the record does not

begin to marshall the evidence . . . ."

Id. at 1053

The

Petitioner "must demonstrate to the appellate courts first how the
trial court found the facts from the evidence and second why such
findings contradict the weight of the ev idence." Id.

As a result

Respondent has been required perform this work at "considerable
time and expense."

Id. at 1053-54. As a result the court should

accept all findings of fact by the trial court lis true.
1053.
7

Id. at

II.

The Injury Did Not Arise Out Of and in the Course Of
Employment
Utah Worker's Compensation Act provides coverage to employees

injured in accidents arising out of and in the course of their
employment.

Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1994).

Whether an injury

arises out of and in the course of employment depends on the facts
and circumstances

of each case.

Utah State Tax Comm'n. v.

Industrial Comm'n. of Utah, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984).

The

reasoning behind the facts and circumstances test is sound.

The

employment relationship has a variety of forms and the worker's
compensation system needs to be able to adapt to those forms.
In defining accidents arising out of and in the course of
employment, courts have traditionally denied compensation for
injuries which occur during the time traveling to or from work.
See, Arthur Larsen, Workmen's Compensation, S 15.00 (1995) and
cases cited therein.

This rule, commonly referred to as the

"coming and going" rule has been adopted in Utah.
Comm/n, 685 P.2d at 1053.

Utah State Tax

While the "coming and going" rule is

often referred to as an exception to coverage, strictly speaking it
is not.

Worker's Compensation coverage extends only to accidents

arising out of and in the course of employment.

Time spent

traveling to and from work, absent special circumstances, does not
arise out of and in the course of employment.

This court has

previously recognized this position because the employer has no
control over the employee when he is coming to work and receives no
real benefit. See, Cross v. Industrial Comm'n, 824 P.2d 1202 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992) .
8

Petitioner confuses the "coming and going" rule by declaring
it to be a two-prong test.

See Petitioner's Brief at 9.

(citing

HiQQins v. Industrial Comm'n., 700 P.2d 704, 707 (Utah 1985), and
Cross v. Industrial Comm'n. , 82 4 p. 2d 1202, 1204 (Utah Ct. App.
1992)). Petitioner contends that in order to be within the "coming
and going" rule one must be traveling to or coming from their place
of employment and driving their own vehicle.
Brief at 9.

See Petitioner's

This is simply an incorrect statement of the law.

Petitioner attempts to arg ue that Utah State Tax Commission
either failed to apply the appropriate test or Hiqqins modified the
rule in order to narrow its application.
support such an argument.

The case law does not

Petitioner makes much of the fact that

Hiqqins was decided subsequent to Utah State Tax Comm'n. However#
in a case decided after Hiqqins, the Utah Supreme Court reiterated
the general rule as set; forth in Utah State Tax Comm'n,

"An

employee is not in the course of his employment while traveling to
and from work."

Cherne Construction v. Posso, 735 P.2d 384 (Utah

1987) (citations omitted).
Therefore, either the courts are flip flopping on the rule or
it has never changed,

closer reading of the Hiqqins case

demonstrates that the court has never changed its position.

In

Hiqqins. the employee injured his shoulder while at work. Hiqqins,
700 P. 2d at 705.

The employee died later that evening after he

drove his car off the road,,

Id

at 7 0 5-0 6.

Higgins ' dependents

filed a claim asserting that the shoulder injury was the

ause of

his leaving the road and ensuing death, they also argued that the
9

decedent's travel to and from work was included in the course of
his employment because of the positional risk doctrine.
706-707.

Benefits were denied.

.Id. at 706.

Id. at

In discussing the

second issue the court stated that, "as a general rule, an employee
is not deemed to be within the course of his employment for
workman's

compensation

purposes

when

he

furnishes

his

own

transportation and is injured while going to or coming from his
place of employment."

Id. at 707 (citations omitted).

In making this statement the court in Hicrains was not further
limiting the "coming and going" rule, it was merely looking at the
facts and circumstances of the case.

Higgins was driving his own

car and he was traveling home, his death was not covered.
Furthermore, if Petitioners limited reading of the rule were
correct, anytime an employee carpooled to work in a car belonging
to someone else he would be covered under the worker's compensation
laws.
v.

Cases have consistently held this to be false.

Industrial

Comm'n. . 670 P.2d

423

(Ariz. Ct. App.

Therefore, Higgins is not dispositive of this issue.
definition

of

the

"coming

and

going"

See Torres

rule

now

1983).

With the

established,

Respondents turn to a discussion of its specific application in
this case.
The "coming and going" rule is premised upon the idea "that it
is unfair to impose unlimited liability on an employer for conduct
of its employees over which it has no control and from which it
derives no benefit."

Whitehead v. Variable Annuity Life Ins., 801

P.2d 934, 937 (Utah 1989). According to Whitehead the major focus
10

in applying the general rule should be on the benefit received and
the control retained by the employer.

Id.

Respondent s concede, however, that under certain circumstances
employers have still been held liable for injuries even though they
occurred while traveling to or from work. Utah State Tax Comm'n.,
685 P.2a

1053.

These circumstances include:

where transportation was furnished by the employer to the
benefit of the employer; where the employer requires the
employee to use a vehicle as an instrumentality of the
business; where the employee is injured while upon a
"special errand" or "special mission" for the employer;
where ingress and egress to the place of employment are
inherently dangerous; and where the employee combines
pleasure and business on a trip, and the business part
predominated.
Id.

(citations

omitted)(emphasi s

added).

The

facts

and

circumstances of this case do not warrant application of any of
these "exceptions."
A.

Custom Landscape; received i;,«,„ benefit

Petitioner contends that worker's compensation benefits should
be granted simply because Vanleeuwen was driving an employer-owned
vehicle.

Thisf however, is an overly simplistic reading of the

law. In addition to allowing Vanleeuwen to use the vehicle, Custom
Landscape must receive some benefit from that use.

Kinne v.

Industrial Comm'n., 60lJ ^J 2d 9?6 pit an 1980) •
In Kinne, Freeport Transport leased a tractor from Charles
Kinne.

Max Wynn, who was hired by Kinne as a driver, took the

tractor to his home during an interruption of a trip from Colorado
to California.

"When he was en route from his home to Freeport's

place of business in Clearfield, Utah, to pick up a trailer and
11

commence the final portion of the trip, the tractor was struck by
a train and Wynn was killed."

Kinne, 609 P.2d at 927.

In

analyzing the case, the court first acknowledged the general rule
that "[w]hether an injury arises out of or within the scope of
employment depends on the particular circumstances of each case."
Id. (citing Moser v. Industrial Comm'n., 440 P.2d 23 (Utah 1968)).
The commission found that "Wynn's practice was to take the tractor
to his home, where he cleaned and serviced it to keep it in proper
running condition."

Id.

All of the required tools were kept at

Wynn's home, and the maintenance work was his responsibility.

Id.

The court determined that all these facts clearly demonstrated that
Kinne derived a substantial benefit from Wynn taking the tractor to
his home.
In the present case all of the repair work was done at the
shop. R. at p. 32. In fact, the only potential benefit alluded to
is the prevention of vandalism.
was not a problem.

However, as the record shows this

When asked on direct examination "were there

any problems with vandalism to the truck down there?"
answered, "no."

Vanleeuwen

R. at p. 12.

The benefit received by the employer must be substantial. In
Lundberg v. Cream o' Weber1, the Utah Supreme Court discussed what
type of benefit was required.

Lundberg was employed by Cream o'

Weber to supervise sales personnel.

"A company automobile was

available to him. But he chose the option given him by the company
of using his own car, for which he was reimbursed at eight cents
1

465 P.2d 175 (Utah 1970).
12

per miles traveled in the course of his duties.

But this did not

include payment for travel to and from work." Id, at 175. An 8:00
a.m. meeting had been scheduled with company personnel.

En route

to the meeting Lundberg was killed in a J ir accident.

Id.

In

discussing the case the court wrote:
it is fundamental that even though the employee may not
be at a regular place of work, he must be performing a
duty for his employer, or one which is so connected with
his employment as to be an essential part thereof, so
that the mandate of the statute is met that there must be
an "accident arising out of or in the course of
employment."
Id. at 176 (emphasis added).

The court held that; travel to work,

even for a special meeting was not essential. Jd. Cream o' Weber
eliminates Petitioner's argument that the journey was essential
because It was earlier than normal.
15.

See Petitioner's Brief at p.

It is also important to note that in Cream o' Weber the court

was appiyi ng a much broader statute. The disjunctive "or" used in
arising out of or in the course of employmei it has i J :>w been repl aced
by the word "and."

See Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-45 (1988).

Another case discussing the benefit required is Cross v. Board
of Review, 824 P.2d 1202 (Utah Ct. App, 1992)

In Cross, the

Applicant, Joel Cross, was driving his van between Salt Lake and
Tooele.
1203.

The* van exploded and Cross was severely injured.

Id. at

The facts showed that "Cross drove iron, h I s home in Tooele

to his foreman's home in Salt Lake City. He left his van there and
traveled to l lit- Coalville worksite in another vehicle. Later that
day, when work had ceased, Cross returned to Salt Lake CI ty, where
he picked up his van and proceeded toward his home in Tooele." Id.
13

At the time of the explosion Cross was carrying batteries that had
been used on a previous job for this employer.

Id. The batteries

did not cause the explosion. Id. Cross asserted, that at the time
of the explosion he was in the course of his employment.

Id.

Cross cited several cases in which travel was to remote job sites.
These cases, including Loffland Bros, which is cited by Petitioner,
were distinguished as

" xoil drilling cases.'"

Id. at 1204. The

Cross court wrote:
The courts ruled in those cases that transportation for
crew members to drilling sites was an integral and
necessary part of employment in the oil drilling industry
and, therefore, the commute and resulting disability were
within the course of employee's employment.
Id. (emphasis added).
The jobsite in the instant case was not remote. In fact there
are no facts to indicate that getting Vanleeuwen to the jobsite was
any more integral and necessary than any other employee.

Mere

arrival at work is not enough of a benefit to bring the employee
into the course of employment.

Cross. 824 P.2d at 1205; See also

Benson. 870 P.2d at 629.
The reason mere arrival at work is not enough of a benefit is
explained in Santa Rosa Junior College v. W.C.A.B., 708 P.2d 673
(Cal. 1985).

The court wrote:

Of course we recognize that in the broadest sense an
injury occurring on the way to one's place of employment
is an injury "growing out of an incident to employment,"
since "a necessary part of the employment is that the
employee shall go to and return from his place of labor."
However, the right to an award is founded not "upon the
fact that the injury grows out of an is incidental to his
employment" but, rather, "upon the fact that the service
he is rendering at the time of the injury grows out of
and is incidental to the employment."
Therefore, we
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reasoned, "an employee going to and from his place of
employment is not rendering any service, and begins to
render such service only when [arriving at the place of
employment ]."
Id. at 676 (citations omitted)(emphasis in original).

Professor

Larson explains: "[W]hen the subject of transportation is singled
out

for

special

consideration

it

is

normally

because

the

transportation involves a considerable distance, and therefore
qualifies under the rule herein suggested: that employment should
be deemed to include travel when the travel itself is a substantial
part

of

the

service

performed."

Arthur

Larson,

Workmen's

Compensation Desk Edition, S 16.31, p. 4-66 (1995).
Petitioner also argues that the employer receives the benefit
of having the truck at work each day. This reasoning is circular,
for if the employer had not allowed the Petitioner to use the
vehicle, there would be no need to return it to the employer's
premises. This situation is distinct from those where the employer
requires the employee to bring in their private vehicle for use in
the business.

In that situation the employer does not own the

vehicle, and the only access to it can be provided by the employee.
In the present case no substantial benefit can be found. The
travel was not integral or necessary.

There had been no problems

with vandalism, as the Petitioner suggests.

In fact there is no

reason to believe that the vehicle was any safer parked at the
Petitioner's home without the round the clock security which was
provided by the Triad Center.
himself to and from work.

The Petitioner simply transported
To bring this accident under the

Worker's Compensation Act would be an illogical extension of the
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doctrine. There is no difference between Vanleeuwen and any other
employee commuting to work.
B.

The Employer did not Require the Employee to
use the Vehicle as an instrumentality of the business

The Claimant asserts that under the rules established in
Bailey v. Industrial Comm'n. and Moser v. Industrial Comm'n., that
he

is

entitled

to

compensation

because

the

vehicle

is

an

instrumentality of the business. However, these cases are clearly
distinguishable.

In Bailey, the Claimant drove his station wagon

to the service station on a daily basis.

The station wagon was

regularly used in the deceased's business.

It was used for

emergency calls and tools necessary to repair service automobiles
or kept inside. Further, Bailey permitted customers to use the car
while theirs were being serviced. The station wagon was carried on
his books as a business asset and oil and gas was charged as a
business expense.

Bailey v. Utah State Industrial Comm'n., 398

P.2d 545, 546 (Utah 1965). The Bailey court relied on an Iowa case
styled Davis v. Blorenson, 293 N.W. 829 (Iowa 1940).

The Bailey

court felt that this was a substantial service required by his
employment. The language quoted from Davis speaks of the Claimant
having no selection as to his mode of travel, " vhe was required
under the terms of his contract to drive his own car from his home
to the shop where it was available to his employer for use in the
employer's business.'" Id. at 547 (quoting Davis).

In the present

case Vanleeuwen was not required by the terms of employment to
drive his own car to work.

Rather, he was given the option to use

the company truck for his commute.
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This courtesy was merely

offered to the employee as a benefit in lieu of a raise in pay.
The employee could have chosen to reject or accept this benefit and
still maintain his position of employment.
Therefore, because
there was no requirement placed upon the employee to drive the
vehicle, the Bailey case is inapplicable.
The case of Moser v. Industrial Comm'n., 440 P.2d 23 (Utah
1968), can also be distinguised.

In Moser, the Claimant suffered

burns while attempting to start his truck.

Id.

Moser had leased

his truck to his employer, Commercial Carriers.

Id.

The truck

company had full rights of possession, use and control over the
vehicle.

Id.

One evening Moser traveled to Commercial Carrier's

terminal and obtained his assignment for the next day.

He then

drove the truck to a lot near his home as was permitted by his
employer.
start.

JEd. at 24.

The following morning the truck would not

"He phoned the Defendant's manager who told him to check

the truck for ignition and gas to try to correct the situation; and
that if he couldn't, help would be sent."

Id.

It was while

carrying out these instructions that the Claimant spilled gasoline
which ignited, causing the burns and subsequent disability.

Id.

The facts of that case indicate that not only did the Claimant
drive the truck home, he engaged in repairing the truck at the
direction of his employer.

There is no question that if the

Claimant in the instant case had been engaged in repairing the
truck in order that it could be brought to the shop for the day's
work, he would have been within the course of his employment.
Further, in Moser it appears that the Claimant had picked up the
truck in order to begin his assignment the next morning as a
17

driver.

Id. Therefore, by arriving at the lot in which the truck

was stored he had entered into the course of his employment.

The

instant case simply does not meet the standards set forth in Moser
or Bailey.

C.

The
Employer
lacked
Control
Activities of the Claimant

over

the

As was stated above, the Utah Supreme Court in Whitehead
established:
The major premise of the going-and-coming rule is
that it is unfair to impose unlimited liability on an
employer for conduct of its employees over which it has
no control and from which it derives no benefit.
Therefore, the major focus in determining whether or not
the general rule should apply in a given case is on the
benefit the employer receives and his control over the
conduct.
Whitehead, 801 P.2d at 937.
they received no benefit.

Respondents have demonstrated that

Therefore, the discussion now turns to

the issue of control.
The facts of this case demonstrate that if Custom Landscape
had any control, it was so insubstantial as to amount to no control
at all.

The only instruction given to Vanleeuwen was that he

should not use the truck for personal purposes.

R. at p. 32.

Custom Landscape had no control over the route that would be taken,
the speed at which the claimant would travel, the traffic signals
which he would choose or not choose to obey.

R. at p. 25.

In

fact, the record demonstrates that Vanleeuwen would occasionally
stop for dinner on the way home from work.

R. at p. 31.

Petitioner cites the case of Mitchell v. Rice, 885 P.2d 820,
822 (Utah Ct. App. 1994), for the proposition that "it is the right
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of control that is the critical element not the actual control
exercised."

This case is inapplicable. Mitchell was dealing with

the question of whether an employment relationship even existed.
Custom Landscape freely admits that Vanleeuwen was an employee at
the time of the accident, however, we dispute whether the injuries
occurred in an accident arising out of and in the course of
employment. Custom Landscape had the "right to control" Vanleeuwen
while he was engaged in his employment. That right to control did
not extend to time spent in transit to and from work.

Vanleeuwen

would stop for personal errands and he would always choose his own
route.

R. at pp. 20, 25.

These are not the indicia of control

necessary to allow coverage under the Act.
III. The use of the Employer's Conveyance Doctrine is a
Misapplication of the Law
By arguing that the instant case involves the employer's
conveyance doctrine the Petitioner is confusing two distinct areas
of the law. According to Professor Larson, "When the journey to or
from work is made in the employer's conveyance, the journey is in
the course of employment, the reason being that the risks of the
employment continue throughout the

journey."

Arthur Larson,

Workman's Compensation Desk Edition § 17.00 (1995). Larson states,
"[t]he justification for this holding is that the employer has
himself expanded the range of the employment and the attendant
risks." This information was dutifully set forth by the Petitioner
in their brief.

See Petitioner's Brief at p. 12-13.

However,

Petitioner neglected to advise the court of the following paragraph
which states:
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It is important in certain cases to observe that the
reasons underpinning the rule on furnishing of travel
expenses or company automobiles in the last section and
the rule on furnishing transportation in a conveyance
under the employer's control in this section are two
different reasons.
The reason for the rule in the
preceding section depends upon the relative importance of
travel as a part of the service performed; the supplying
of cash or cars is evidence of the status of the journey
as part of the compensated employment. The reason for
the rule in this section depends upon the extension of
the risks under the employer's control.
Larson, at S 17.00 (emphasis added) See Torres, 670 P.2d at 426-27.
An employer's conveyance involves a situation in which for example
the employer would send a vehicle around to pick up the Claimant
and drive him to work.

In this instance, the vehicle is under the

control of the employer and any injuries that would occur would
result from expansion of the risk.
In the present case the facts are not such that the employer
picked the employee up and transported him to work, the employer
merely allowed him the use of his vehicle.

Further, as was

explained above, Custom Landscape had no control over this journey.
That the Petitioner is confusing the law is further demonstrated by
his commingling of citations from Section 16 which deals with
furnishing transportation and Section 17 which deals with the
employer's conveyance doctrine.
IV.

Sister State Cases
Distinguishable

cited

by

the

Petitioner

are

The first case cited by the Claimant is Hanson v. Estate of
Harvey, 806 P.2d 450 (Idaho Ct. App. 1990).

In Hanson, Gerald

Hanson and Robert Layman were employed by Don Harvey Roofing
Company.

Id. at 450.

At the time of the accident they were
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traveling in one of Don Harvey's trucks driven by a co-employee,
James Harvey. Layman and Hanson applied for and received worker's
compensation benefits in Washington. In Idaho they sought recovery
for damages

in Tort, arguing the contrary position taken in

Washington.

Jd. at 451.

with

the

exception

The court stated the general rule along

for

accidents

incurred

while

"going and

returning in some transportation facility furnished by the employer
. . . ."
This

Id. at 451-52.
is a case

squarely within the employer

conveyance

doctrine. Hanson and Layman were not provided with a company car,
they were picked up by a fellow employee in a company truck and
driven to the job site.
conveyance.

The employer retained control over the

Furthermore, the court was likely influenced by the

fact that they had previously received worker's compensation from
benefits in Washington and then tried to deny their status as
employees

in

Idaho.

As

has been demonstrated,

the present

situation did not involve an employer's conveyance, rather it
involved a company car which was given to the employee to travel to
and

from work, no control was retained by Custom Landscape.

Hanson, therefore, is inapplicable to the present situation.
The next case cited by Claimants is Loffland Bros, v. Baca,
651 P.2d 431 (Colo. Ct. App. 1982). In Loffland Bros, the Claimant
was injured in a one car accident while riding in a vehicle driven
by a fellow driller.

In deciding the case the Court of Appeals

looked at the totality of the circumstances.

Id. at 432. Factors

considered in arriving at their decision were: the considerable
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distance of driving from the office in Colorado to the drilling rig
in Vernal, Utah; the benefit to the employer of having a full crew
on hand; and the fact that the driller was paid to collect the crew
and bring them to the drill site.
employer's conveyance situation.

This again is a classic

Loffland Bros, had complete

control over the driver who was paid to go and pick up workers and
bring them to the work site.

Further, the considerable distance

traveled made driving a substantial part of the employment.

These

are facts not present in the instant case.
The Claimants also cite Maryland Casualty Co. v. Messina, 874
P.2d 1058 (Colo. 1994), for the proposition that the Colorado
Supreme Court has synthesized the decisions in Loffland Bros, and
Varsity Contractors Home Ins. Co. v. Bacca, 709 P.2d 55 (Colo. Ct.
App. 1985).

However, because the facts in Loffland Bros, are

inapplicable and the fact that Petitioner's travel was no more
requested

than

any

other

employee's,

Maryland

Casualty

is

inapplicable.
The Petitioner continues to rely heavily on Colorado cases
such as Benson v. Colorado Comprehensive Ins. Authority
Monolith Portland Cement v. Burrack

3

2

and

In Benson the Claimant was

a nurse injured in an automobile accident while traveling between
job assignments for her employer.

Benson, 870 P.2d at 627.

court reasoned:

2

870 P.2d 624 (Colo. Ct. App. 1994).

3

772 P.2d 688 (Colo. Ct. App. 1989).
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The

Generally injuries sustained while traveling to and
from work are not considered to have occurred within the
scope of employment. However, an exception applies when
the employee's travel is at the express or implied
request of the employer or when the travel confers a
benefit on the employer beyond the sole fact of the
employee's arrival at work.
Here,
Plaintiff
was
traveling
between
job
assignments for her employer, and because of the nature
of her employment, this travel conferred a benefit on
Alpha and Omega beyond the mere fact of her arrival at
work.
Id. at 627 (citations omitted).
Once again, the present case is distinguishable.

Had the

Petitioner been traveling from one mowing job to another, clearly
the accident would have been one arising out of and in the course
of employment. However, Petitioner was merely commuting to work in
the morning,
employee.

his

situation was

no different

than any other

He was not conferring "a benefit on [the employer]

beyond the mere fact of [his] arrival at work."

Id.

Monolith, at first glance, appears somewhat analogous to the
present situation.
differences.

However, a closer look uncovers significant

Ronald Burrack died in an automobile accident in

Colorado while driving to work in Wyoming.

Monolith had provided

Burrack with a company car. Burrack was allowed to use the car for
both personal and business purposes.

Monolith, 772 P.2d at 689.

Monolith paid for insurance and for fuel.

Id.

On the morning of

the accident Burrack suffered a heart attack and lost control of
his vehicle. The court held that, "ordinarily, an employee injured
while traveling to or from work is not entitled to compensation."
Id.

(citations omitted).

The court then stated,
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"when the

employer agrees to provide the worker with means of transportation
or to pay the employee's cost of commuting, the scope of employment
inferentially

includes

(citations omitted) .

the

employee's

transportation."

Id.

If this was all the court had stated this

case may have been persuasive, however, the court went on to list
several other factors in their decision.

The court found that,

"Burrack's home, and indeed even the vehicle, had become part of
his work place."

Id. at 690.

Evidence was admitted showing that

Burrack had dictating equipment in the car and often dictated
company business during his commute.

Id.

In fact, the dictating

machine was on at the time of the accident.
case

the

Claimant

was

involved

Jd.

in no work

In the present

activities while

traveling to and from work. The record shows that he often filled
out time cards when he arrived at home, but this was his choice.
The cards could have been filled out at the office before the trip
home at night.

Merely choosing to perform work at home does not

bring the worker under the act. Therefore, Monolith is completely
distinguishable.
The final Colorado case cited by the Claimant is Industrial
Comm'n.

v.

Lavach.4

In

Lavach

the

company

had

explicitly

contracted with Lavach to provide a company truck and Lavach often
performed deliveries on his route home as a benefit to the company.
Id. at 363-361.

Vanleeuwen did not regularly run errands for

Custom Landscape on his route to and from work.

The record shows

that he was on call during the winter, but such was not the case in
4

439 P.2d 359 (Colo. 1968).
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May when this accident occurred.

R. at pp. 24-25.

Vanleeuwen's

only purpose in driving that morning was his arrival at work.
The Petitioner next discusses the case of Maryland Casualty
Co. v. Lorkovic, 641 A.2d 924 (Md. Ct. App. 1994).

The Maryland

Casualty case is again factually distinct from the present case.
Lorkovic was injured in a one car accident while driving home from
the Baltimore-Washington
Maryland
travel.

Casualty

International Airport.

regularly

reimbursed

Lorkovic

Id. at 927.
for business

This included reimbursement for mileage between his home

and the airport.

id. at 935.

The court felt that this was

important in light of the fact Maryland Casualty did not pay
Lorkovic for normal travel between his home and the office. Again,
Vanleeuwen was not on any business trip, rather he was commuting
between his home and oficce.
The

final case cited by the Petitioner

is Jose Andrade

Painting v. Jaimes, 428 S.E.2d 640 (Ga. Ct. App. 1993).
Petitioner

properly

somewhat suspect.

stated

the rule, but his

application is

The Georgia Court of Appeals wrote:

It is well settled that xa workman injured going to
or [coming] from the place of work is not "in the course
of his employment." There is an exception however, as
well established as the rule itself. The exception,
which is supported by overwhelming authority, is this:
When a workman is so injured while being transported in
a vehicle furnished by his employer as an incident of the
employment, he is within "the course of employment," as
contemplated by the act. In other words when the vehicle
is supplied
by the employer for the mutual benefit of
himself and the work and to facilitate the progress of
the work the employment begins when the workman enters
the vehicle and ends when he leaves it on the termination
of his labor. . . .'"
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The

Id. at 641-642 (citations omitted)(underline added).

The rule

states that not only must the vehicle be furnished by the employer,
but it must also be furnished for the mutual benefit of the
employer and the employee.

If the Georgia rule is applied to the

present case, Petitioner loses.

As has been demonstrated several

times, no benefit has been received by Custom Landscape.

There

were no problems with vandalism and mere arrival at work is not
enough.

Further, to argue that the benefit is the arrival of the

truck at work is circular.
While all of these cases are inapplicable to the present case,
there is another reason to disregard them.

Utah has a well

developed worker's compensation system and the courts have clearly
set forth the standard to be met when dealing with these issues.
To the extent that these cases are inconsistent with utah law they
should be disregarded.

If the court desires to look to other

jurisdictions, two cases are more clearly on point than any cited
by the Petitioner.
The New Mexico case of Rinehart v. Mosman-Gladden, Inc., 423
P.2d 991 (N.M. 1967) is amazingly similar to the case at hand. In
Rinehart, the Claimant was employed as a gardener by Mosman-Gladden
for approximately seven years.
beginning

his

employment

with

Xd. at 991.

A few months after

Mosman-Gladden,

a vehicle was

provided to Rinehart for his use at work and in going to and from
work.

Id.

The vehicle was provided in lieu of a pay raise. JEd.

In March of 1965 while traveling home in the vehicle the Claimant
was injured in a collision.

Id. The Claimant argued that because
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"he was en route home in transportation furnished by his employer
pursuant to contract between them, he was, therefore, in the course
of his employment at the time and entitled to receive workman's
compensation."

Id. The courts stated the general coming-and-going

rule and then discussed its exceptions.

Ld. at 992.

The court,

citing Professor Larson, stated:
The basic principle or premise underlying the
"exceptions" to the going-and-coming rule and the clue to
their proper limits is found in the principle that the
injury is compensable only when the journey is an
inherent part of the service for which the employee is
compensated or where the travel itself is a substantial
part of the service performed.
Id.

The court relied heavily on the following facts:
His duties in behalf of the employer had terminated
for the day. He was not being compensated for the time
spent en route between the place of work and his home.
The accident did not occur on the employer's premises,
nor did Plaintiff's duties require his presence at the
place where the accident occurred. The risk which caused
the accident was one common to the traveling public and
was not created by his employment.

Id.

The court also felt that it was important that the Claimant

was not being required to transport himself or his crew an unusual
distance; he was not performing any duties which would make the
travel an inherent part of his employment; and the vehicle was not
under the control of his employer.

Ld.

For these reasons the

court denied compensation. The Rinehart case, more than any other,
is analogous to the situation at hand.
Another helpful case is Funk v. A. F. Scheppmann & Son Const.
Co., 199 N.W.2d 791 (Minn. 1972). In Funk, the Claimant resided in
Worthington,

Minnesota.

headquartered in Minnesota.

Scheppmann,

his

employer, was

also

The Claimant was employed as a field
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supervisor on Scheppmann construction projects

in Iowa.

The

Claimant was furnished with a company pickup truck, together with
expenses for its operation.

The Claimant was permitted to use the

truck in going to and from his home on evenings and on weekends.
The decedent was killed in an automobile accident while traveling
to his home in Minnesota.

Id. at 792.

A statutory provision

stated:
Where the employer regularly furnished
transportation to his employees to and from the place of
employment such employees are subject to this chapter
while being so transported . . .
Id. (citing Minn. Stat. S 176.011 (16)).
The Minnesota Court of Appeals determined that this provision was
inapplicable to "an employee who, although using his employer's
motor vehicle with the employer's permission, is traveling to or
from his home for his own personal convenience and not in the
performance of services for his employer."

Id.

One interesting note from both Funk and Jose Andrade is the
use of the language "while being transported."

A plain reading of

this language can only lead to the conclusion that the employer
must be doing the transporting.

In other words the employer must

retain control over the travel.

As has been demonstrated in the

instant case no control was retained.
In the present case, the Claimant was using the vehicle solely
for his personal convenience in traveling to and from work.

The

sole benefit conferred upon the employer was Claimant's arrival at
work, which has already been held as insufficient to being an
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employee under the statute.

Cross, 824 P.2d at 1205; see also

Benson, 870 P.2d at 627.
V.

Failure to Obey Traffic Signal only goes to Issue of
Control
Claimant makes an argument that the failure to obey a traffic

signal does not remove the Claimant from the course of employment.
Respondents are well aware that the fault is not an issue under the
Worker's Compensation Act.

No argument has been made that the

failure to obey the traffic signal removed the Claimant from the
course of employment.

However, respondents assert that the

Claimant's failure to obey the traffic signal is another indicator
of the lack of control respondents had over the situation, and
therefore, should be looked at in any examination of the totality
of the circumstances.
VI.

Extension of Worker's Compensation Coverage would Violate
the Purpose of this System
Petitioner was correct in asserting that one of the purposes

of the worker's compensation

system

is to provide

financial

stability to workers injured in accidents arising out of and in the
course of their employment. However, that is not the sole purpose
of the worker's compensation system.
The purpose of the Worker's Compensation Act "is to
provide speedy and certain compensation for workmen and
their dependents and to avoid the delay, expense and
uncertainty which were involved prior to the act; and the
concomitant purpose of protecting the employer from the
hazards of exorbitant and in some instances perhaps
ruinous liabilities. ••
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Lantz v. National Semiconductor, 775 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah Ct. App.
1989)(quoting Adamson v. Oakland Construction Co., 508 P.2d 805,
807 (Utah 1973))(emphasis added).
There is no question that courts should take into account the
purpose of financially stabilizing the worker. However, the court
should also consider the purpose of not placing exorbitant and
often ruinous liabilities on the employer.

If the employee is

deemed to be in the course of employment merely because a car is
furnished, regardless of the fact that no control is retained and
no benefit is received by the employer, two things will occur.
First, workers compensation will move one step closer to forcing
employers to become a general insurer of all its employees for any
injuries they receive regardless of when they occur. Second, small
businesses, such as Custom Landscape, which cannot afford to give
higher pay will abstain from providing other "perks" in lieu of pay
raises. This will serve only to hurt both employers and employees.
Make no mistake, but that Petitioner is seeking a definate
expansion to the exisitng worker's compensation system.

Such an

expansion is solely the province of the legislature, and should
accordingly be left to that branch of the government.

The Utah

worker's compensation Act is not a body of law that has grown stale
over time and therefore requires judicial repair, rather it is a
vibrant area of the law constantly under the scrutiny of the
legislature.

In fact rather than expand coverage, the legislature

has removed the disjunctive "or" and created a more narrow coverage
that reads "arising out of and in the course of employment."
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Conclusion
The Utah Worker's Compensation

Act provides

coverage to

employees for injuries suffered in the course of their employment.
This coverage, however, does not extend to injuries which occur
traveling to and from work.

The facts in this case demonstrate

that

substantial

Vanleeuwen

received

a

Custom's truck to and from work.

benefit

from

driving

The facts also demonstrate that

Custom received no benefit. There was no vandalism, the benefit of
having the truck there is circular, and the benefit of having
Vanleeuwen arrive at work is simply not enough.

Furthermore,

Custom Landscape had no control over the Claimant's travels to and
from work.

Finally, any further extensions to the coverage

provided by the Worker's Compensation Act would impose onerous
liabilities

on

the

employers

of

potentially devastating effect.

this

state

and

could

have

The employers of this State are

not, nor should they be the general insurers of the health of their
employees.
The

Worker's

Compensation

Act

was

established

by

the

legislature to cover injuries from accidents arising out of and in
the course of employment.
this test.

Mr. Vanleeuwen's injuries do not meet

For these reasons the decision of both the ALJ and the

Industrial Commission should be upheld and benefits should be
denied.
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Dated this

* '

day of

fM^i^,

1995.
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THEODORE E. KANELL
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for
Custom
Landscape
Services and CNA Insurance
Company
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